Hate Speech II

One of the consequences of the term"hate speech" being ambiguous and inexact is that it is used interchangeably with other types of speech. Two common examples are offensive speech and derogatory or disparaging speech.

Offensive speech is not necessarily hate speech for the simple fact that it is quite possible to be offensive without being hateful. It is possible, in fact to be offensive without knowing it, and towards people for whom one otherwise holds great affection. Offense is quite subjective and whether particular speech or particular words are offensive depends almost entirely on context. Any speech is potentially offensive to someone, and subjective offense should not deprive wider and less sensitive audiences of the benefits such speech may provide. Speech can be offensive for any number of reasons; it may be insulting, disrespectful, misleading, profane, ill-mannered, careless, or indiscreet. These do not necessarily diminish the value such speech may have, and are are not necessarily hateful. Persons who disagree on a subject are quite likely to find those competing views offensive. Speech that is part of rigorous debate, i.e. speech that is potentially most useful in addressing social. political, economic and philosophical problems is therefore prone to offensiveness, and is therefore the type of speech that should be most readily tolerated and protected. Offensive speech is necessarily free speech, and to the extent that speech is considered "hateful" because it is offensive, it too is free speech.

Derogatory or disparaging speech is often reflexively referred to as hate speed because the use of a disparaging term suggests animus. Thus, for example, a factually correct statement that a person belongs to a particular racial group may be taken as hate speech if the racial group is identified with a racial slur. Even in unambiguous cases however, the use of a slur is a species of offensive speech, not a separate category of speech that warrants special treatment because of its uniqueness. The use of a slurs is an inelegant and ill-mannered declaration regarding the attitude of the speaker, rather than a a concise way of disclosing an otherwise unappreciated and damaging fact about a group. To say "Elton John is a homosexual" is a rather rather straightforward, and presumably non-controversial statement of a widely known fact. To say "Elton John is a fag" discloses nothing new about the subject of the sentence but does reveal the attitude of the speaker. It is a shorthand way of saying "Elton John is a homosexual and I have negative attitudes toward homosexuals." The use of a slur is  the confession of the speaker regarding his own attitudes, and such confessions are the basis of free speech. To the extent that a slur expresses a hateful attitude toward a particular individual or group, it is nonetheless free speech.

There are other difficulties encountered when labeling speech as "hate" when it is based on that speech being disparaging or derogatory. In keeping with the notion of slurs, one realizes that slurs are a form of slang; the meaning is fluid and the derogatory nature can be hidden by clever speakers using double entendre, puns and other rhetorical devices. What constitutes a slur depends on context and in contemporary usage, the characteristics of the speaker. This is evident in the spectrum of racial and sexual slurs that are used in certain types of music. Some words, even if not considered obvious slurs are disfavored in common discourse, even though they were once regarded as proper language, such as the the term "colored."

Other derogatory speech is not obviously hateful, although its context makes clear the derogatory intent. One such example is the frequent references to George W. Bush as a "cowboy." The term Cowboy is not generally regarded as derogatory or offensive, and its use in reference to the 43rd President does not convey a sense of hatred toward cowboys or a particular loathing of the Mr. Bush. It does however express a derogatory opinion of certain policy and actions, without being "hate speech." Derogatory speech is not necessarily hate speech.

Hate Speech

Much of the discourse about the First Amendment concerns the notion of "hate speech." If fact, much of the discourse about discourse concerns hate speech, and so we have internet companies monitoring and censoring that has some perceived nexus with that term. We hear proclamations that "hate speech is not free speech," and other such gaseous notions without a firm concept of what is and is not "hate speech."

"Hate speech" is a nebulous term that has no legal validity. It has no validity because it is vague, and thus cannot serve as a practical discriminant between what is proper and what is not. The adjective "hate" carries a connotation of being undesirable, but whether this is true or not depends on context. Is it okay to hate genocide, or starvation, or cancer?  Or does the concept of hate speech only become operational when the object of it is an approved class? Consider the three statements:

John Wayne Gacy was a homosexual.

Alan Turing was a homosexual.

Rush Limbaugh is a homosexual.

Are any of these hate speech? Is the first one? And if it is, is the object of the hatred John Wayne Gacy or homosexuals? Is it hate speech in some contexts and not others? Is it hate speech if it's true?
Is it possible for the first statement to be hate speech but not the second? Is the third statement libelous if it is not true? Can something be hate speech if it is not libelous if untrue?

Are the statements:

I hate John Wayne Gacy

I hate Rush Limbaugh

hate speech? They have the word "hate" right there in them! Are these proscribed by "hate speech" principles? Current usage seems to suggest that hate speech only applies to groups, not individuals, and is concerned with potential animus toward those groups, rather than any factual observation about them.

The meaning of hate, and indeed the nature of hate, is not precise enough to be of legal significance. Hate is an emotion, and as with other emotions is subjective. The exact same thought may be motivated by hatred or be completely unrelated to it. The substance of a statement does not conclusively establish its motivation.