Myths, Narratives and Make-Believe

 A previous post mentioned the role that make-believe plays in bot day-to-day human interactions as well as larger endeavors such as political movements. The hypothesis presented was that make-believe is an innate and largely useful element of how humans contend with competing socializing instincts and uncertainty associated with contemplation of the future. The post also referred to comments regarding make-believe by Eric Hoffer in his book The True Believer, and how make-believe was an essential component in motivating members of mass movements. Similar ideas were noted in the writings and philosophy of the syndicalist Georges Sorel.

Sorel, in his Letter to Daniel Halévy defines "myths" as "expressions of a will to act." The designation of myth makes no implication regarding factual content. The purpose of this post is to consider some current public discourse from this perspective. It is not intended to either affirm or refute current ideas.

Taking Sorel's definition as a starting point, we should immediately make a clarifying distinction: that between myth and narrative. If we limit a myth to Sorel's definition, i.e. an expression of the will to act, narrative consists of those vignettes and stories that support the myth and maintain it as it encounters real-world events and individual experience. From here we may give a few examples of current myths and contrast them with associated narratives:

Myths include: Manifest Destiny, American exceptionalism, systemic racism, gender as a social construction, "whiteness," climate change, the global community, etc. Again, the characteristic that makes these myths in the Sorelian sense is their capacity to motivate action, regardless of their factual validity. Narratives include those stories; e.g. discrete police shootings; election irregularities regarding late night vote dumps, educational discrepancies, etc. that are used to maintain the myth and sustain its ability to enable " a will to act."

Both Sorel and Hoffer used early Christianity as an example of the effectiveness of motivating beliefs, i.e. myths, in the growth of the religion. Both Hoffer and Sorel note the role that these beliefs had in the resolve and influence of early martyrs. It is interesting to note that Hoffer spoke of make-believe and Sorel of the imperviousness of myth to reasoned opposition. Sorel asserted that myths are used to defend movements against "objections to practical possibility." This particular attribute of myth helps explain why critics denounce particular movements as "religions" or "cults," as in the cult of global warming, or the religion critical race theory, or the cult of Donald Trump. Myths do not need to make sense; their purpose is not to persuade but to motivate.

Sorel claimed that a myth is the opposite of what he called a "utopia," and considered that utopias are intellectual abstractions that in themselves do not lead to action. Sorel noted however that all successful myths have "a utopian element," and this bears some resemblance to Hoffer's claim that all mass movements have a "millenarian" component. Hoffer suggested that the professed goals of a mass movement are always within the scope of imagination, but always just beyond realization. This again resembles Sorel's observation regarding "objections to practical possibilities." This phenomenon addresses one of the most striking paradoxes of modern political discourse: why myths that seem to produce actions that have desirable results generate counter-myths.

One may conceive that one of the most consequential myths of American history is the statement in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal." It is of course facially untrue as a general proposition although defensible against "objections to practical possibilities in more rigorously defined circumstances, for example "equal before the law," or "equal in the eyes of God." Nonetheless, the myth conformed to Sorel's definition, i.e. the expression of a will to act" that motivated the war of American Independence, the Civil War, the Civil Rights amendments, the Civil Rights Act, Brown v. the Board of Education, etc. When this myth seems closer than ever to realization, ideologies arise to replace it with myths that "equality" is an alibi for injustice that prevents "equity." This new myth has the characteristics identified by Sorel: an expression of the will to act, defense against against "objections to practical possibility," and a utopian element. Similar observations can be made regarding myths such as "gender is socially constructed," or that anti-social behavior is a result of poverty. 

That myths, narratives and make-believe have been a part of human history and played prominent roles in how society developed seems to be uncontroversial, even if one considers only the myths that accompanied the spread of the Great Religions. What remains to be determined is the role that modern phenomena such as social media; partisan, non-objective news media; and myths masquerading as scientific "consensus" have on history. There is also a question of whether the actions that myths, narratives and make-believe are presumed to motivate will have predictable outcomes, or simply provoke counter-myths in an unending series of human restlessness.

One thing to note is that, while myths do not have to be credible, narratives do. The more ridiculous narratives become the more they detract from, rather than support underlying myths. Thus, silly notions, such as that the word "picnic" is offensive, are likely to degrade the myths intended to organize collective will and produce collective action.