Chomsky, Doctrines and Science

 In a 1971 academic discussion with Michel Foucault, Noam Chomsky made the following observation:

“…the fundamental property of behaviorism, which is in a way suggested by the odd term behavioral science, is that it is a negation of the possibility of developing a scientific theory.”

This insight is significant, especially if one infers from the specific case of behavior to the realm of doctrines in general. Professor Chomsky’s observation might be schematically presented as

“…the fundamental property of [subject of doctrine]ism, which is in a way suggested by the odd term [subject of doctrine] science, is that it is a negation of the possibility of developing a scientific theory.”

One may try this with any number of doctrines, or more colloquially, -isms. For example, the economic theory of distributism, which arose from Catholic social teaching and specifically is concerned with the just allocation of a society’s resources, would provide the following principle in Professor Chomsky’s formulation:

“…the fundamental property of distributism, which is in a way suggested by the odd term ‘distribution science,’ is that it is a negation of the possibility of developing a scientific theory.”

The same process might be applied to any number of doctrines; nationalism, socialism, supremacism, racism, classism etc. Professor Chomsky’s fundamental insight is preserved: the adoption and promotion of a doctrine impairs the ability to rationally assess the underlying conditions that give rise to that doctrine. Thus, for example, the preservation of a particular concept of “racism” impairs the rational inquiry into what might otherwise be considered “race science.” The doctrines surrounding the contemporary concept of racism puts many conjectures that would be assessed in a rigorous race science beyond consideration.

The validity of Professor Chomsky’s insight can be observed by how various doctrines of the middle ages impaired the advancement of science, and how social doctrines in early America impaired the scientific assessment of social problems. Defense of a doctrine involves defense of beliefs, regardless of the source of those beliefs. Doctrines are hostile to skepticism for this reason. This is contrary to the rational approach that is characteristic of science in which skepticism is, or should be a central part.

Consequences of the tension between doctrine and science, and more ominously the substitution of doctrine for science leads to dubious claims such as that any particular science is “settled,” or that “consensus” obviates the need for skepticism and further inquiry.

Doctrines, of all types, are congenial to politics and may be quite useful to political interests, but their inherent tension with science and rational inquiry leads to unfortunate result that politics often squanders the best opportunities for human flourishing.